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Highlights 
• We survey 524 Shanghainese on acceptance of the car license auction policy  
• Moderately positive perception of effectiveness, but still negatively support 
• 28 billion CNY collected but details of its usage unknown to the public 
• Equity and implementation facets are perceived more negatively than affordability 
• License auction and congestion charge are preferred to parking charge and fuel tax  
Abstract 
Increased automobile ownership and use in China over the last two decades has increased 
energy consumption, worsened air pollution, and exacerbated congestion. However, the 
countrywide growth in car ownership conceals great variation among cities. For example, 
Shanghai and Beijing each had about 2 million motor vehicles in 2004, but by 2010, Beijing had 
4.8 million motor vehicles whereas Shanghai had only 3.1 million. Among the factors 
contributing to this divergence is Shanghai’s vehicle control policy, which uses monthly license 
auctions to limit the number of new cars. The policy appears to be effective: in addition to 
dampening growth in car ownership, it generates annual revenues up to 5 billion CNY (800 
million USD). But, despite these apparent successes, the degree to which the public accepts this 
policy is unknown. 
This study surveys 524 employees at nine Shanghai companies to investigate the policy 
acceptance of Shanghai’s license auction by the working population, and the factors that 
contribute to that acceptance: perceived policy effectiveness, affordability, equity concerns, and 
implementation. Respondents perceive the policy to be effective, but are moderately negative 
towards the policy nonetheless. However, they expect that others accept the policy more than 
they do.  Respondents also hold consistently negative perceptions about the affordability of the 
license, the effects on equity, and the implementation process. Revenue usage is not seen as 
transparent, which is exacerbated by a perception that government vehicles enjoy advantages in 
obtaining a license, issues with the bidding process and technology, and difficulties in obtaining 
information about the auction policy. Nevertheless, respondents believe that license auctions and 
congestion charges are more effective and acceptable than parking charges and fuel taxes. To 
improve public acceptability of the policy, we make five recommendations: transparency in 
revenue usage; transparency in government vehicle licensing and use, categorising licenses by 
vehicle type, implementation and technology improvements to increase bidding convenience, 
and policies that restrict vehicle usage in congested locations.  
Key Words: car ownership policy, public acceptance, vehicle quota control, license auction, 
Shanghai 	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1  INTRODUCTION 
In the first quarter of 2009, in no small part due to government measures to stimulate the 
automobile industry, China overtook the U.S. to become the largest automobile market in the 
world. Total automobile sales in China reached 13.8 million in 2009 (Xinhua, 2010). In 2010, 
both automobile production and automobile sales reached 18 million, including 13.8 million 
passenger cars, most of which were used domestically. Not surprisingly, Chinese cities now face 
serious transportation problems such as traffic congestion, high gasoline consumption, severe air 
pollution, and excessive carbon emissions. 
The countrywide growth in car ownership conceals great variation among cities. For 
example, Shanghai and Beijing each had about 2 million motor vehicles in 2004, but by 2010, as 
shown in Figure 1, total motor vehicle ownership reached over 3.1 million in Shanghai 
(Shanghai Statistic Bureau, 2011) and 4.8 million in Beijing in 2010 (Zhongshang Data, 2011). 
Growth was very fast in both cities, but Shanghai’s growth rate was about half that of Beijing. 
Among the factors contributing to this divergence is Shanghai’s quota control for passenger cars. 
In 1994, when private vehicle ownership was still low in China, the Shanghai government 
referenced Singapore’s car quota policy and began to use monthly auctions to limit the number 
of vehicle licenses issued (Jin, 2009). As a result of the growing population and economy, the 
demand for vehicle licenses has continued to increase. The price of a lifetime car license 
averaged CNY48,600 ($7,600) in 2011. The policy appears to be effective: in addition to 
dampening growth in car ownership, it generates annual revenues up to 5 billion CNY - 
reportedly channelled into support for transportation.  
 
FIGURE 1: Total motor vehicle ownership and annual growth rate in Shanghai (Shanghai 
Statistics Bureau, 2011) and Beijing (Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2010) (Zhongshang Data, 
2011) from 2001 to 2010 
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Despite these apparent successes, the degree to which the public accepts this policy is 
unknown. Vehicle licenses in Shanghai cost more than 100 times the price of licenses in Beijing, 
and can be more expensive than the car itself for many smaller models. This has not only led to 
affordability and equity concerns, but also to speculative activities. Many Shanghai residents are 
obtaining non-local licenses from other jurisdictions for lesser cost. These responses complicate 
the situation, exacerbate implementation and trust issues, and thus negatively affect public 
acceptance of the auction policy. It is this acceptance which must be studied in order to improve 
the policy and to increase its effectiveness.   
This paper presents the findings of a survey designed to investigate public acceptance of 
Shanghai's car license auction policy. The three primary objectives are: 1) to benchmark license 
auction policy acceptance levels among Shanghai residents; 2) to investigate key determinants of 
public acceptance, including perceived policy effectiveness, affordability, equity concerns, trust 
in the policy and government, and the implementation process; and 3) to evaluate the 
effectiveness and acceptance of the policy in comparison to other congestion mitigation 
instruments such as congestion charges, parking charges, and fuel taxes.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature that follows provides an overview of past research into the car quota policy 
in Shanghai, with reference to experience elsewhere. Although the works cited vary in context, 
method, and conclusions, most note that transport policies and public acceptance are location and 
context specific. However, none of them offers a thorough evaluation of the specific 
determinants of public acceptance of the license auction policy. The public acceptance of 
Shanghai’s license policy is an empirical issue to be tested in a local setting with local data.  
The discussion is organised as follows: 1) the origin of the car quota policy in Singapore, 
2) the implementation of the policy in Shanghai, 3) public acceptance of such policies, and 4) the 
determinants of public acceptance.  
2.1 Experiences from Singapore  
Singapore implemented its car quota policy in 1990, 4 years prior to Shanghai. Phang et 
al.'s (1996) review of Singapore’s car quota policy and implementation indicates that it achieved 
its goals: absolute certainty in the numbers of cars; and improving the quality of cars imported. 
However, Phang notes that the policy suffered from unintended consequences - including 
speculative activities - that caused significant public concern. Based on their evaluation of policy 
measures to curb speculation, they suggest that transport policies must be perceived as fair if 
they are to be acceptable. They also propose the creation of an asset market for vehicle licenses..  
2.2 Implementation in Shanghai 
Wang (2010) compares Shanghai's car quota policy and Beijing's driving restriction - 
among other existing and possible policies - with the experiences of each policy in western cities. 
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He notes that Shanghai’s car quota policy failed to address the uncertain relationship between 
vehicle ownership and vehicle use. Wang also notes that the policy had a distortional impact on 
the vehicle market, affecting the auto industry. He thus concludes that the local context can 
significantly influence policy performance and must be carefully considered before any policy is 
implemented. However, he does not evaluate public acceptability 
Hao et al. (2011) also focus on Shanghai and Beijing's auto policies. They model the 
growth of fuel consumption by passenger vehicles in Shanghai and Beijing with and without the 
policies then in place. They find that in Beijing the increase in vehicle ownership has offset the 
fuel consumption savings of limiting vehicle use. In Shanghai, the vehicle ownership policy has 
significantly reduced aggregate fuel consumption by passenger vehicles, but the average fuel 
consumption rate and the average vehicle distance travelled has increased. The results suggest 
that while Beijing’s policy provides a short-term energy conservation solution, Shanghai’s policy 
offers a long-term solution. They thus recommend that a balance must be struck between traffic 
conditions, energy consumption, vehicle markets, and social equity.  
Liu’s (2008) historical overview of Shanghai’s license auction policy finds that it eased 
traffic congestion to some extent, and generated large amounts of revenue to spend on 
transportation infrastructure, but that the resulting reductions in automobile sales negatively 
effected the economy. The high price of licenses in Shanghai led to speculative activities and car 
owners obtaining non-local licenses. Like Hao et al. (2011), Liu concludes that Shanghai’s 
policy encouraged more vehicle usage, partially offsetting the policy's effect. Liu suggests that 
Shanghai should restrict vehicle usage rather than continue to restrict ownership through the 
license auction policy.  
2.3 Public Acceptance of Car Ownership Policy 
Chen et al. (2008) investigates public perceptions and acceptance of various congestion 
mitigation policies including congestion pricing, parking charges, and fuel taxes in Shanghai. 
The responses from a survey of academics, interest groups, and local authorities (187 valid 
responses) show a common resistance to charging schemes and vehicle restrictions, especially 
towards congestion pricing. Chen et al. suggest that car restriction policies - such as license 
auctions - are necessary to generate government revenues, despite low public acceptance. To 
increase policy effectiveness, they recommend that the government educate the public about the 
costs and causes of congestion prior to implementation. While their study collected first-hand 
data on public acceptance, it was limited in size and scope. There was also no detailed 
assessment of Shanghai’s auction policy or the key determinants of public acceptability.  
2.4 Determinants and Variation of Public Acceptability 
Jakobsson et al. (2000) investigate the factors that determine car users’ acceptance of 
road pricing via a survey of 524 car owners and their spouses living in central Sweden. The study 
includes an assessment of perceived fairness, infringement on freedom, and expectations of 
others’ car use reduction. The resulting model indicates that road pricing acceptance is 
	   6 
negatively affected by perceived infringement on freedom and unfairness. Lower income is 
associated with lower acceptance of road pricing. The expectation that others would reduce car 
use is positively related to a personal intention to reduce car use and further to the acceptance of 
road pricing. Similar to road pricing, factors such as perceived infringement on freedom, 
unfairness, and income levels may also influence the acceptance of a license auction policy.  
 
3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1 Framework 
We begin by measuring the respondents' perception of congestion in Shanghai and their 
views on the need for policy intervention. The respondents' awareness of the policy is tested to 
ensure that they have sufficient understanding of the policy to make a meaningful evaluation. We 
then investigate the current acceptance level, changes in acceptance, and respondents' 
expectations of others’ acceptance. Using the literature review and firsthand knowledge of 
Shanghai, we have developed a framework (Figure 2) to organize the possible determinants of 
public acceptance. These determinants are investigated under three broad topics: core policy 
specifics, implementation, and preference variations.  
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Policy	  Acceptance
Equity
Affordability
Effectiveness
Unintended 
Consequences
Location &
Transit
Implementation 
Process
Context
Income EducationAge Gender Having Children
House locationTransit Access Commuting distance
Overall licensing 
process
Bidding 
process
Information 
provision
Speculation
Affordability
Government 
vehicle
Private vehicle 
auction Transparency
Comparison to 
other cities
Non Local 
license
Effectiveness
Congestion Awareness
Current	  
Acceptance
Expectation	  of	  
Others’	  
Acceptance
Residence
Car useCar ownership Car Behaviour & AttitudeCar pride
Car 
dependence
Change	  of	  
Acceptance
Socioeconomics
Core policy 
drivers
Implementation
Preference
Variations
Fuel taxesCongestion charges
Parking 
charges Other Policy Options  
FIGURE 2: A framework for evaluating key determinants of public acceptability  
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The core policy determinants of public acceptability in Figure 2 are perceived 
effectiveness, affordability, and equity concerns. Equity is assessed on four dimensions: equity 
within private vehicle auction policy, equity regarding government vehicles, equity compared to 
other Chinese cities, and transparency in government revenue usage.  
Three components of the implementation process are measured: convenience of the 
process of obtaining a Shanghai license, policy information provision, and technical issues in the 
bidding process. Unintended consequences, including speculation and non-local licenses, are 
also expected to influence public acceptability.  
Preference variations include car behaviour and attitudes, home location and transit 
accessibility, and typical socioeconomic variables such as income, age, gender and education. 
Car dependence and car pride (pride in car ownership and use) are included in order to capture 
the impact of attitudinal factors on public acceptability of the policy.  
Shanghai has investigated various other congestion mitigation policies that might replace 
or supplement the license auction policy such as congestion charges (Tong, 2012) and parking 
charges (Li, 2012). This study investigates Shanghai residents' attitudes to the license auction 
policy in comparison to congestion charges, parking charges, and fuel taxes.  
3.2 Questionnaire Survey  
3.2.1 Sampling frame  
This paper focuses on the employed population in Shanghai including both local and 
migrant workers. The sample represents the middle-class population who are well-off enough to 
consider having a car, but not too rich to disregard the cost of a license. They are thus likely the 
group most affected by the car license auction policy. Such focus limits the study from being 
generalized to represent the acceptance of the whole population - particularly those who are 
unemployed or very low-income.  
We used a two-stage sample: purposeful sampling for the selection of companies in 
Shanghai and random sampling for the selection of employees in the chosen companies. In the 
first stage, we selected nine companies varying in business type, location, size, and ownership 
(government and private).They included four engineering companies, two design companies, one 
research institute, one trading company, and one chemical plant factory. They were distributed 
from the central district (within the inner ring road) to the outskirts (outside the outer ring road), 
and ranged from 20 employees to 500 employees. Five of them are government owned and four 
are privately owned. Appendix A lists the companies. The second stage randomly sampled 
employees in each company. In companies with less than 200 employees, all employees were 
invited to participate. In large companies, 200 employees were randomly selected to participate. 
Overall we distributed 1,100 questionnaires to employees.  
3.2.2 Questionnaire design and survey implementation  
The questionnaire design and survey implementation consisted of three stages:   
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1) After the initial questionnaire design, the authors used email and telephone to 
interview Shanghai residents and the contact person in each company, and to evaluate the quality 
and suitability of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was revised as necessary.  
2) A pilot survey (March 25, 2011) was then conducted online among 62 employees in 
one company, with 48 valid responses. The pilot data were analysed to verify the length, 
language and sequencing of the questionnaire, and the reliability and validity of the attitudinal 
indicators. The questionnaire was again revised. The pilot data are not included in the reported 
survey results.   
3) The full survey was implemented over three weeks in May 2011. Respondents could 
choose an online or paper-based questionnaire. A cover letter explaining the study objectives was 
sent to the company contact person who then distributed the survey to the employees. The 
contact person explained to employees that the survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. 
The letter also explained that no incentives or disincentives were offered, and respondents could 
end their participation at any time. Respondents who chose the online questionnaire received the 
web address at their company email address. Paper-based questionnaires were used where 
Internet access was not available or where employees preferred a paper-based survey. A drop 
box at the company collected paper responses. Employees at four companies completed the 
online questionnaire, three completed the paper-based questionnaire, and two used both methods.  
3.2.3 Questionnaire structure and contents 
The final questionnaire includes seven sections: (1) policy awareness; (2) car ownership 
and travel behaviour; (3) perceptions of congestion and necessity for policy intervention; (4) 
attitudes towards the license auction policy; (5) attitudes towards non-local licenses; (6) attitudes 
towards other congestion mitigation policies; and (7) location and socioeconomic background. 
Section 4 is the core of the survey. It assesses overall acceptance of Shanghai's auction policy, 
perceived effectiveness, and attitudes towards affordability, equity, and the implementation 
process. The questionnaire includes 102 Likert-scale psychometric statements as indicators of 
people’s attitudes and perceptions. Each statement has five response levels: strongly agree, 
partially agree, neutral, partially disagree, and strongly disagree, coded 2, 1, 0, -1 and -2, 
respectively. The questionnaire was developed in both English and Chinese, with the Chinese 
version distributed to the sampled employees.  
3.3 Survey Data 
The 1,100 questionnaires distributed produced 827 responses (75%). After cleaning the 
data and removing inconsistent responses and missing values, the number of valid responses was 
524 (48%). Table 1 reports the sample characteristics. Compared with Shanghai city-wide 
statistics, the sample skews to young, male, highly educated, and relatively higher income 
residents. 42% of the sample own a car and 28% drive as their main mode of travel. The great 
majority of respondents live within one kilometre of a subway (71%) or bus service (91%). 
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Commuting distances vary greatly: 28% commute less than 5 kms, 33% commute 5 to 14.9 kms, 
and 39% commute more 15 kms or more.  
TABLE 1: Survey sample characteristics (demographic, socioeconomic, land use and 
public transit access) (N = 524) 
Variables of samples Values Survey 
sample 
(%) 
City Statistics (%)e 
Demographics  
Gender Male 
Female 
67 
33 
50 
50 
Age a 18–34 
35–59 
60+ 
69 
30 
  1 
24 
43 
23 
Have children Yes 
No 
37 
63 
 
Household size 1 
2 
3+ 
Average household size =  
13 
24 
63 
3 
 
 
 
2.93 
Residence  Born in Shanghai 34  
Resident for  
• < 2 years 
• 2–5 years 
• 5–10 years 
• > 10 years 
 
  9 
22 
14 
21 
 
Socioeconomic  
Education level High school or below 
College/University 
Masters+ 
  7 
79 
14 
70 
26 
  4 
Household income 
(monthly) 
Low (< ¥ 4k ) 
Middle (¥ 4k–10k) 
High (>= ¥10k) 
Monthly household income   
14 
38 
49 
¥8,500 
 
 
 
¥7,041 
Car ownership Yes 
• 1 car 
• 2+ cars 
No 
42 
37 
  6 
58 
14 
Location and public transit access  
House location b Zone 1 
Zone 2 
Zone 3 
Zone 4  
31 
28 
39 
13 
Zone 1                                  20 
Zone 2&3                             34 
 
Zone 4                                  46 
Public transit access 
(Subway) 
Low (> 1 km) 
Middle (0.25–1 km) 
High (< 0.25 km) 
29 
46 
25 
 
Public transit access 
(Bus) 
Low (> 1 km) 
Middle (0.25–1 km) 
High (< 0.25 km) 
  9 
39 
52 
 
Travel behaviour 
Commuting distance Short  
• <1 km  
• 1–4.9 km 
Middle  
28 
  7 
21 
33 
cAverage trip distance (whole 
city) = 6.5 km 
 
Average trip distance (central 
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• 5–9.9 km 
• 10–14.9 km 
Long 
• 15–29.9 km	  
• 30 km+	  
18 
15 
39 
19 
20 
city) = 5.4 km 
Commuting time Short 
• <5 min 
• 5–15 min 
Middle 
• 15–30 min 
• 30–45 min 
Long 
• 45–60 min 
• 60–90 min 
• >90 min 
18 
  4 
14 
40 
22 
18 
42 
24 
13 
  5 
cAverage commuting time 
(central city) = 40.8 min 
Mode share Driving 
Car sharing 
Motorcycle 
Taxi 
Bus 
Subway 
Bike 
Walk 
28 
  4 
4 
2 
11 
15 
  9 
29 
cPrivate motor vehicle         20 
 
Motorcycle                          4.6 
Taxi                                     6.6 
Bus                                    12.9 
dSubway                              5.7 
Bike                                  13.5 
Walk                                 26.2 
Electric bike                      15.2 
a The age groups used in Table 1 allow comparison with city statistics. The age grouping used in the study analysis 
(<=30, 30–50, 50+) better reflects the sample characteristics of the survey respondents. 
b Figure 3 below highlights the ring roads in Shanghai that separate Shanghai regions into four zones. Zone 1 is 
mapped within the Inner Ring Road; Zone 2 is between the Inner Ring and the Middle Ring Road; Zone 3 is 
between the Middle Ring and the Outer Ring Road; and Zone 4 is outside the Outer Ring Road.  
c Data as an average for the whole city obtained from the Fourth Travel Survey conducted in 2009 in Shanghai 
(Shanghai Municipality, 2010).  
d City statistics for subway mode share is based on the 2009 Travel Survey. Shanghai metro has undergone dramatic 
expansion after 2009, and therefore subway mode share in 2011 is expected to be higher.  
e (Shanghai Statistic Bureau, 2011) 
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FIGURE 3: Map of Shanghai ring roads 
 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Congestion Level and Need for Policy Intervention 
Shanghai’s high level of traffic congestion is clearly recognised by the survey 
respondents. Figure 4 shows that over 85% of respondents agree/strongly agree that Shanghai is 
very congested, and 90% agree that the Shanghai government should take further action. These 
findings suggest a potentially solid basis for public acceptance of the auction policy. 
	  
FIGURE 4: Perception of current congestion levels (left) and need for further government 
actions on congestion mitigation (right) 
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4.2 Auction Policy Awareness 
Awareness of auction policy is evaluated as a confirmation that respondents' ratings are 
meaningful, and as preparation for the policy questions. Table 2 shows that awareness of general 
and specific policy is very high. More than 70% of the respondents know about the policy to a 
very specific level. For example, 72% are aware of a photographic system recently installed on 
elevated roads to enforce the non-local license policy (question X4). Overall, it appears that the 
respondents have enough policy knowledge to answer the attitudinal questions meaningfully.  
Table 2: Policy awareness  
General Policy Statements	  
Respondents 
aware of policy 
(%) 
X1 -  Shanghai municipality uses a license quota auction policy to control and limit the number of licenses being released every month. 83 
X2 -  The price for the license in February 2011 has increased to more than ¥40,000.	   75 
Specific Policy Statements  
X3 -  
Vehicles with non-local plates are prohibited from driving on elevated roads during 
rush hours (Monday through Friday between 7:30–9:30 a.m. and 16:30–18:30 p.m.). 
Vehicles caught violating	  the rule will be fined ¥ 200.	   76 
X4 -  
Beginning on February 25, 2011, the Shanghai government has installed Traffic 
Control Photographic Systems on elevated roads to apprehend drivers with non-local 
plates driving during rush hours. 72 
X5 -  
Shanghai vehicle licenses include urban plates (Plate A/B/D/E/F) and a suburban 
plate (Plate C). Car owners who want to register urban plates must go through the 
public auction; Plate C, however, does not require public auction, though vehicles 
with Plate C are only allowed to drive outside the Outer Ring Road. 68 
X6 -  Shanghai license quota auction takes place on the third Saturday of each month.	   46 
X7 -  
When the vehicle has been scrapped, the car owner can apply to keep the original 
plate quota for new vehicles, but the car owner needs to operate the vehicle for at 
least 3 years before it can be scrapped. 43 
X8 -  Car owners must apply to keep the license quota within 6 months after the old vehicle has been scrapped; otherwise, the government will put the quota back for auction. 35 
4.3 Overall Policy Acceptance 
Current public acceptance is measured using the five indicators presented in Table 3 (X9 
to X13). The five indicators are highly correlated (Cronbach’s alpha is greater than 0.7, 
indicating a high internal consistency of the data). Figure 5 graphs the distribution of the mean 
value of the five indicators across the sample. The overall policy acceptance level is low: only 27% 
are positive; 43% are negative; and 30% are neutral.  
Change in acceptance is measured retrospectively by indicators X14 and X15: 39% 
indicated that they adjusted to the policy over the years; and 44% said that their acceptance had 
increased considerably. Overall there is a slight positive trend in the public acceptance.  
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Indicator X16 measures perception of other people’s acceptance of the policy. Whereas 
27% of respondents were personally positive about the policy, 47% thought that other people 
accepted the policy. Jakobsson (2000) interpreted the expectation of others’ intentions as 
anticipated social pressure on individual behaviour and a higher expectation that others’ views 
would support the individual’s own view of the policy.  
TABLE 3: Policy acceptance and changes (% of respondents in agreement) 
	   Statement	   	   	   	  
Sign	   Acceptance	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
+ X9 - I support the quota auction policy in Shanghai. 36% 20% 44% 
+ X10 - I hope the auction policy can continue to be 
implemented in Shanghai. 34% 22% 44% 
- X11 - Shanghai government should not use the quota 
auction policy to mitigate congestion. 59% 21% 20% 
- X12 - I cannot accept the quota auction policy as there 
are numerous problems with the existing policy. 58% 27% 15% 
- X13 - If voting, I do not want the quota auction policy 
to continue to be implemented. 57% 22% 20% 
 Change	  of	  Acceptance    
+ X14 - I have already become used to people obtaining 
licenses via the auction policy. 44% 21% 35% 
+ X15 - My acceptance towards the policy has increased 
considerably over recent years. 40% 26% 34% 
 Expectation	  of	  others’	  acceptance	      
+ X16 - Other people do accept the policy.	   53% 10% 38% 
 
FIGURE 5: Distribution of policy acceptance level 
Following the framework in Section 3.1, Figure 6 summarises public acceptance towards 
Shanghai’s license auction policy and attitudes towards policy specifics that affect acceptance. 
Each factor is measured by multiple indicators, where the values reported is the mean of the 
indicators corresponding to the factor. While respondents consider the policy to be moderately 
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effective in dealing with congestion, most attitudes towards effectiveness, affordability, equity, 
and implementation are negative, as discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
Note: +2.0 indicates the most positive perception, -2.0 the most negative and 0.0 neutral. 
FIGURE 6: Public acceptance of license auction policy and attitudes towards policy 
specifics affecting acceptance 
4.4 Core Policy Drivers: Effectiveness, Affordability, and Equity 
4.4.1 Effectiveness 
Shanghai Metropolitan Transport White Paper (Shanghai Municipality, 2002) suggests 
that the license auction policy has controlled vehicle ownership growth, reduced congestion, 
provided time and funds for improving public transit and road infrastructure, and contributed 
towards transit oriented development in Shanghai. The public’s perception of policy 
effectiveness is positive but less admirable than the official claim, as shown in Table 4. 48% of 
respondents agree that the policy has solved Shanghai's congestion problem, and 42% believe 
that, without the auction policy, traffic conditions would be worse. However, perceptions of 
policy effectiveness are low compared with the perceptions of Shanghai's congestion levels. As 
noted in Section 4.1, 85% of respondents said that Shanghai is very congested. 
TABLE 4: Policy effectiveness (% of respondents in agreement) 
	   Statements	   	  
	  
Sign	  
	  
Policy	  effectiveness	   Strongly/	  partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/	  
partially	  disagree	  
+ X17 – The Shanghai government has solved the congestion 
problem by implementing the license quota auction policy. 47% 29% 24% 
+ X18 - Without the auction policy, there will be a rapid 
growth of car ownership and the traffic condition in 
Shanghai will worsen. 
42% 27% 31% 
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4.4.2 Affordability 
Shanghai license prices have fluctuated significantly. In July 2011, the average bidding 
price exceeded ¥50,000 - more expensive than a small car (e.g., a Cherry QQ cost ¥33,800). 
Many residents of Shanghai may be able to afford a small vehicle, but not a car and a license.  
Indicators X19 to X22 (Table 5) measured the public's perception of license affordability. 
73% of the respondents said that many people could not afford a license, and 56% said cars were 
only for rich people. On the other hand, 30% felt that the price was still personally affordable, 
and 21% did not care about the price as long as they could get a license. Survey respondents had 
a higher than average income, thus population concerns over affordability are likely higher than 
the results reported here.  
TABLE 5: Statements on license affordability (% of respondents in agreement) 
	   Statement	   	   	   	  
Sign	   Affordability	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X19 - Many people cannot afford the high license price. 73% 16% 11% 
+ X20 – The price of the Shanghai license is still within 
my financial affordability. 30% 21% 49% 
- X21 - The high price of the license has resulted in cars 
being available only for rich people. 56% 21% 23% 
+ X22 - I do not really care about the price of the license 
as long as I can get one and drive my car. 21% 21% 58% 
When asked to give an acceptable price for a license, respondents typically said ¥5,000 to 
¥9,999, less than one-fifth of the bidding price at the time of the survey. When asked to give a 
license price that would be acceptable and effective in reducing congestion, respondents 
increased the price to ¥20,000 to ¥29,999, still far less than the actual bidding price.  
In personal communication with the authors, Mr. Yao, a senior police officer who 
manages traffic in Shanghai and works with transportation planners, explained that the 
government wanted to keep the license price between ¥30,000 and ¥50,000. Any price over 
¥50,000 would be too high and could cause public dissatisfaction, but any price lower than 
¥30,000 would not be effective. Mr. Yao indicated that the government adjusted the price by 
changing the license quota every month: when the price was too high, the next month's quota 
was increased, and vice versa. This approach contrasts with stated license policy where the quota 
is set based on road infrastructure and the number of cars that can be accommodated, and then 
allows the license price to respond. Figure 7 summarises the price ranges discussed.   
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FIGURE 7: Shanghai license price range - acceptable price range, combined effectiveness 
and acceptance price range, government intended price range, and average 2011 ongoing 
price  
4.4.3 Equity 
Four sets of equity concerns are evaluated within the survey instrument: equity in private 
vehicle auctions, restrictions in government vehicles, fairness compared with other cities, and 
transparency in revenue usage. Table 6 provides details of the questions and responses. 
TABLE 6: Statements on equity (in % of respondents in agreement)    
	   Statement	   	   	   	  
Sign	   Equity	  in	  private	  vehicle	  auction	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X23 - The auction policy is not fair as it auctions the cars 
together; thus the car price and car type do not matter. 71% 16% 13% 
- X24 - Shanghai's quota auction policy is not fair as it makes 
the road that is constructed using revenue collected from all 
residents only for a small portion of rich people. 
67% 19% 14% 
- X21c - The high price of the license has made cars available 
only for rich people. 56% 21% 23% 
	   Perception	  on	  government	  vehicles	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X25 - There should be more restrictions on the license quota 
for government financed vehicles than on private vehicles. 85% 11% 4% 
- X26 - Government should reduce the total quota released per 
month for government financed vehicles to reduce the ratio 
of government vehicles on Shanghai’s road. 
84% 11% 5% 
- X27 - Government should reduce and restrict the quota that 
each government department and agency can bid. 9% 15% 76% 
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+ X28 - There should be a relaxation on the quota limit for 
government vehicles as doing so will make government 
agencies more convenient and accessible. 
17% 18% 65% 
	   Fairness	  compared	  with	  other	  cities	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X29 - Drivers in cities outside Shanghai have more freedom 
as they do not need to auction for their licenses. 80% 15% 5% 
- X30 - The auction policy is not fair as it makes people in 
Shanghai pay more than people in other cities do to enjoy the 
same freedom of driving. 
62% 22% 16% 
- X31 - The lottery policy in Beijing is fairer than Shanghai's 
auction policy, as no matter how much money you have, you 
can still join the lottery and have a chance to win a license 
quota. 
59% 23% 18% 
 Transparency	  in	  revenue	  usage Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
-	   X32 - I do not know about the usage of the revenue collected 
from the auction.	   86% 11% 3% 
- X33 - Shanghai should make the revenue usage transparent to 
the public for auditing. 85% 12% 3% 
+ X34 - The revenue collected is for government use, which 
has no need to be transparent to the public. 17% 12% 71% 
c The same indicator, X21, is used to measure both affordability and equity in a private vehicle auction.  
Equity in private vehicle auction policy 
The lack of affordability of the Shanghai license has caused concerns about the policy 
favouring the rich. Respondents' perceptions of equity in the private vehicle auction are 
consistently negative: most respondents said that the policy is unfair and makes roads and cars 
available only to the wealthy. Singapore categorises vehicles by capacity (Phang, 1996), but 
Shanghai treats all vehicles the same. 71% of respondents indicate that this is unfair because it 
pits people who can only afford a cheap vehicle against those who can afford a luxury vehicle.  
Restriction on government vehicles 
In 2004 Shanghai announced that government vehicles would also be subjected to the 
auction process for the first time, but with a separate quota limit (Zhou, 2004). These 
government vehicle auctions take place every two months. A base price is established using the 
previous month’s average bidding price at the private vehicle auction. Anecdotally, many car 
owners complain about the high percentage of government vehicles being driven on Shanghai’s 
roads and particularly the private use of government vehicles. They consider the system unfair 
because government vehicle licenses are paid with taxpayers’ money, but private car users had to 
pay with their own money. More than 80% of respondents indicate	  that there should be more 
restrictions on the total number of government vehicles. 
Fairness compared with other Chinese cities 
Until 2011 Shanghai was the only city in China that restricts automobile ownership using 
license quota. Over half of the respondents consider the car ownership policy unfair because it 
makes Shanghai residents pay more than residents of other cities to enjoy the same freedom of 
driving. Since 2011 three Chinese cities have also introduced their car ownership control policies: 
	   18 
Beijing started the car license lottery policy in Jan 2011, Guizhou in Aug 2011 and Guangzhou a 
hybrid model combining license auction and lottery in Aug 2012. These cities following suit may 
influence Shanghai public’s perception of this aspect of fairness.  
Transparency and trust in revenue usage 
Shanghai’s license auction policy has generated large amounts of revenue for road 
infrastructure and public transport. For example, Shanghai did not have a subway until 1995, but 
the system is now among the most rapidly expanding systems in the world (Shanghai Tour, 
2011). Figure 8 shows the annual revenue collected from the auction calculated based on the 
average price of successful bids and the number of licenses released each month. As a 
comparison Shanghai municipal subsidy to public transportation operation in 2010 is 2.5 billion 
CNY, which can be more than offset by the license auction revenue in the same year (4 billion 
CNY). From 2002 to 2011 Shanghai’s license auction generated an estimated 28 billion CNY.  
 
FIGURE 8: Annual revenue collected from the license auction in Shanghai from 2002 to 
2011 (Data: Shanghai Jinwei Automobile, 2011; Calculated by the Authors). 
However, the actual amount of revenue and its specific uses have not been made known 
to the public. On May 22, 2009, lawyer Yu submitted a request to the government to release 
detailed information on revenue usage (Wang and Zhou, 2011). In response, only rough 
estimates and general indications of spending usage were provided. Because specific revenue 
usage was kept secret, the auction policy appeared to be simply another government funding 
source.  
The survey respondents' attitudes towards transparency in revenue usage is 
correspondingly consistently negative. Over 80% believe that there is a lack of transparency in 
revenue usage, and that the Shanghai government should make the detailed usage public for 
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auditing. 82% believe that auction revenue should be used to improve the public transit system 
and reduce transit fares.  
4.5 Implementation Specifics  
4.5.1 Process of obtaining a Shanghai license 
Shanghai’s license auction policy is managed and implemented by the Vehicle 
Management Department under the Shanghai Traffic Police Bureau. The Shanghai Auction 
Company manages the license auction, which takes place the third Saturday of every month 
(China License, 2011). Bidders must register and pay a ¥ 2,000 deposit to obtain a bid auction 
card for the monthly auction (China License, 2011). The bid auction card expires six months 
after registration, and unsuccessful bidders can use the card for a maximum of three times. 
Unsuccessful bidders must wait to join the next month’s auction with no guarantee of a license 
that month. To bid, an applicant needs a driving license. A temporary driving permit valid for a 
maximum of 15 days is available. An individual can apply up to three times for the permit. 
The time limit for the bid auction card and the limitations on temporary driving permits 
have raised concerns about the inconvenience of the whole process. More than 70% of the survey 
respondents indicate that the process of obtaining a Shanghai car or driving license is both time 
consuming and complicated, as shown in Table 7. 
TABLE 7: Statements on the implementation process (% of respondents in agreement) 
	   Statement	   	   	   	  
Sign	   Process	  of	  obtaining	  a	  license	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X35 - Obtaining a license through auction is very time consuming 
in Shanghai; there is no guarantee that you will win the bid. 77% 17% 6% 
- X36 - You have to use a temporary license to drive before you win 
the bid in the auction; it is very inconvenient as one can only apply 
for a temporary license 3 times and each can be used for a 
maximum of 15 days. 
77% 18% 5% 
- X37 - The whole process of obtaining a license to be able to drive 
is very complicated and time consuming in Shanghai. 70% 23% 7% 
- X38 - Car owners who cannot immediately obtain a plate must wait 
another month, as the license bidding takes place only once per 
month, which is very time consuming. 
70% 20% 10% 
	   Bidding	  format	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	  
- X39 – Using the Internet and phone bidding is not very reliable as 
sometimes one failed to place a bid successfully due to network 
paralysis or congestion in the phone lines. 
69% 24% 7% 
- X40 - Bidders could not obtain the actual bidding details using the 
Internet or phone bidding. 62% 30% 8% 
- X41 - There are many loopholes in the bidding process, making it 
difficult to be fair and transparent. 57% 33% 10% 
- X42 - There might be speculative activities and black casework 
existing in the bidding process and system. 59% 33% 8% 
	   Information	  provision	   Strongly/partially	  agree	   Neutral	  
Strongly/partially	  
disagree	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- X43 - Shanghai's auction policy is continually changing, and I 
cannot find or confirm the most current rules and specifications. 73% 21% 6% 
- X44 - I cannot update my knowledge of the changes made in the 
policy. 73% 21% 6% 
- X45 - Car owners often realise the change in policy only after they 
have been fined. 64% 27% 9% 
 
4.5.2  Bidding format 
The auction's bidding technology has also generated complaints. Winning bids are 
selected first on price and then on time. The system ranks the bidders by bid price. If the month's 
quota is 8,000 licenses, the system accepts the 8,000 highest bids. Initially, all bids had to be 
made in the Auction Hall. Phone bids were introduced in 2003. In 2008, bidding in the Auction 
Hall was cancelled in an attempt to avoid the chaos that arose during the bidding process. The 
auction system was changed to a two-stage bidding process that allowed for price adjustments to 
be made after the first stage (China License, 2011). Under the new system, no price limit was set 
and bidders could bid any price in the first stage. The number of first stage bidders and the 
lowest winning prices were made known. In the second stage, up to two adjustments were 
allowed within ¥300 above or below the lowest winning price of the first stage.  
Internet and phone bidding options have made the bidding process more convenient, but 
created room for speculation. There are rumours of “black-case operations”, and many believe 
that the bidding price is manipulated by car dealers and traders who hoard licenses and by traders 
who spread rumours of higher prices and/or bid a high price in the first round so the system can 
report the high price in the second round (Chen, 2008;	  (Xie, 2010). Public concern has been 
further increased because of lack of transparency in detailed bidding information, and technical 
difficulties in the bidding systems. For example, many bidders have lost a bid because of system 
breakdowns, and the July 2009 auction was cancelled due to network paralysis.  
Survey respondents indicate that the bidding technology is not reliable and lacks 
transparency. Nearly 60% of respondents agree that loopholes in the bidding process make it 
difficult to be fair, and over half believe that speculative activities exist in the bidding process.  
4.5.3 Policy information provision 
Public information about the bidding policy is limited. For example, there is no single 
source online or offline to check the regulations.  Participants obtain information from various 
newspapers, policy notices, or auction guidelines posted ad hoc in public space or online. Survey 
respondents indicate that policy information is not properly updated and that it is difficult to 
track policy specifications and changes. Over half believe that car owners only became aware of 
policy changes after being fined for breaking a rule. 
Some people additionally question the legal basis of implementing this auction policy 
(Xie, 2010). When Shanghai’s public auction policy was introduced, it was based on the 
“Regulations on Shanghai Motor Vehicle Administration” in 2000 (Yu and Hou, 2010). These 
regulations were replaced by the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Road Traffic Safety” 
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in 2004. No information about any additional regulations drafted for Shanghai's auction policy is 
available. As far as the authors can tell from publically available sources, no legal documents 
currently govern the auction policy.  
 
4.6 Unintended Consequences 
High and increasing license prices in Shanghai have seemingly pushed many locals to 
register their cars in other cities in order to bypass the auction. The average license outside 
Shanghai costs only 5% of a Shanghai license, but is less convenient to administer. Figure 9 
compares the average car and license prices of local licenses with non-local licenses: the 
Shanghai license price averaged 13% of the car price whereas the non-local license price 
averaged only 3% of the car price.  
Non-local license (NLL) holders who drive on Shanghai’s roads without purchasing a 
local license reduce auction policy effectiveness, resulting in revenue loss, difficulties in traffic 
management, equity concerns among local car owners, and damage to the trustworthiness of the 
entire auction policy. However Shanghai must balance these goals with its role as a metropolitan 
center for the country. It cannot simply impose harsh restriction on non-locally licensed cars. By 
devising and gradually revising policies to inconvenience vehicles with NLLs, not ban them, the 
government has successfully compromised between the city’s open-ness on the one hand, and 
compliance with vehicle control policy on the other hand (Zhao, Block-Schachter and Chen 
2012). 
 
FIGURE 9: Comparison of car price and license price between Shanghai and non-local car 
licenses  
4.7 Congestion Mitigation Policy Options 
Survey respondents were asked to consider three policy instruments that might replace or 
supplement the auction policy: parking charges, congestion charges, and fuel taxes. The 
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questions investigated public acceptance and perceived effectiveness without specifying the 
details of the policies. Improving public transit was included in the pilot survey but removed in 
the main survey because it dominated the responses, making it impossible to distinguish between 
other policy options. 
Figure 10 plots the survey respondents' attitudes towards these policies on a five-point 
numerical scale where 2 indicates very effective and very acceptable, and -2 indicates ineffective 
and not at all acceptable. Congestion charges and the license auction were the best-perceived 
policies in both dimensions, followed closely by parking charges. Fuel taxes were by far the 
worst - perceived as neither acceptable nor effective. When the respondents were asked to rate 
the four policies combining acceptability and effectiveness, fuel taxes remained the least 
favourable policy. It is interesting that the respondents gave license auctions poor marks when 
they evaluated the policy on its own, but higher marks when compared with other policies. It 
suggests that context within which a policy is evaluated may well influence the result of the 
evaluation. This is consistent with Tversky and Kahneman (1981), which shows that framing of a 
problem can affect the outcome in part from the manipulation of the decision options offered.  
	  
FIGURE 10: Acceptability and effectiveness of congestion mitigation policies 
Figure 11 shows how car ownership influences respondents' attitudes towards license 
auctions, parking charges, congestion charges, and fuel taxes. The attitudes of car owners are 
circled, and the arrows show the direction of change between non-car owners' and car owners' 
perceptions of policy acceptability and effectiveness. Car owners were consistently more 
negative about parking charges, congestion charges, and especially fuel taxes than non-car 
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owners. But they were more positive about license actions - presumably because they have 
already paid for the license. Car owners saw the license auction as the best option while non-car 
owners saw congestion charges as the best.  
	  
	  
FIGURE 11 Acceptability and effectiveness of congestion mitigation instruments between 
car owners (circled) and non-car owners. (Arrows indicate the change in attitude after 
obtaining a car.) 
4.8 Results of Disaggregate Analysis  
An additional disaggregate analysis based on the Structural Equation Model by the 
authors (Chen and Zhao 2012) finds that the most important differences between population 
segments lie between car owners with a Shanghai license (positive attitude towards the policy), 
car owners with non-local license (significantly negative attitude) and non-car-owners 
(moderately negative attitude). Because of the license cost, the license auction effectively 
recruits local car owners as a supporting constituency for the car deterring policy. Fewer cars on 
the road makes their already paid for licenses more valuable (for example, by less traffic). It 
creates an interesting dynamic: the more people own cars, the more the policy would be 
supported, but the less effective it will be.  
 
-0.6 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.3 
0.6 
-0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 
A
cc
ep
ta
nc
e	 
Effectiveness	 
License auction 
Parking charges 
Congestion charges 
Fuel tax 
	   24 
5 DISCUSSION 
This paper assesses the acceptance of Shanghai's license auction policy by the working 
population in Shanghai via a survey of 524 employees at 9 companies. The results suggest that 
policy acceptance among respondents is moderately low but increasing, and that expectations are 
that others would support the policy. Respondents mostly perceive the policy as effective, but 
believe it is neither affordable nor equitable. Equity concerns are focused on transparency in 
revenue usage and the perception that government vehicles enjoy various license advantages. 
Respondents also are negatively disposed towards the bidding process and technology, and the 
amount of information available about the license auction policy.  
On the basis of these results, we make five recommendations. First, transparency in 
revenue usage must be addressed. These findings suggest that if the public knew where their 
money is spent, it would increase public acceptance of the auction policy. The Shanghai 
government should publish detailed revenue usage information in order to demonstrate that the 
revenue is used to improve public transit and reduce public transit fares in Shanghai. This 
information would reveal both the intent and effectiveness of the current policy regime. 
Second, better controls and restrictions on government vehicles would likely mitigate 
equity concerns about government vehicles. For example, the government could reduce the quota 
for government vehicles, and increase transparency regarding the total number, purpose and 
usage of government vehicles. Controlling the private use of government vehicles would also 
help alleviate public concerns.  
Third, categorising vehicles by type and capacity in the auction (so more expensive 
vehicles would pay more than budget vehicles) would increase policy fairness and acceptability 
but the specifics such as the quota ratio between various vehicle types need to be carefully 
thought through.  
Fourth, improvements in the implementation process could increase public acceptance. 
For example, moderately increasing the length of the temporary driving permit period would 
ease the process of obtaining a license in Shanghai. So too would improving the bidding system 
technology, and providing necessary bidding information to the public. For example, a website 
for Shanghai’s license auction that maintains and organises policy specification documents and 
updates would allow more informed bids. Such a website could also maintain current, updated 
information about license auction procedures and applications, traffic conditions, road 
construction, and improvements in public transit.  
Finally, although Shanghai’s license auction policy has effectively controlled growth in 
the number of vehicles, the demand for cars continues to increase. The car license policy alone 
may not be sufficient in the future. Supplementing policies aimed at car ownership with those 
that restrict vehicle usage in congested locations and during peak hours may be more effective. 
When comparing the license auction policy with other instruments such as congestion charges, 
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parking charges and gasoline taxes, the respondents rated license auctions and congestion 
charges as the most effective and acceptable policies. 
Building on these results and recommendations, four directions for future research stand 
out. 1) The paper identifies a plethora of factors that may influence people’s acceptance. A 
structural equation model could be developed to quantify the strength and direction of these 
factors and their impacts on policy acceptability. 2) Study respondents were all employed and 
had higher than average education and incomes. A study of the lower income and unemployed 
Shanghainese may reveal different attitudinal responses. 3) Changes in attitude are examined by 
cross-sectional retrospective measures. Panel data is necessary to measure the dynamics of 
attitudinal change over time. 4) Beijing and Shanghai transportation policies have evolved 
disparately since the early 1990s. Shanghai chose to manage car ownership, while Beijing chose 
to control car use. Then, in 2011, Beijing adopted a monthly quota for vehicle licenses, but chose 
a distinctly different allocation mechanism—a license lottery. A comparison of the different 
paths the two biggest cities in China have taken would be of value.  
Innovative policies implemented in Shanghai are often embraced by other Chinese cities -  
Shanghai acts as a role model (Bezlova, 2007). For example, as mentioned in the fairness 
comparison between Shanghai and other cities, Guangzhou implemented a hybrid model of car 
ownership control in 2012, borrowing from both Shanghai and Beijing. Half the vehicle quota is 
allocated via an auction and half through a lottery. Thus, while this paper focuses on Shanghai, 
its experience, both positive and negative, can be useful to other Chinese cities seeking suitable 
solutions to mitigate congestion. The framework developed in this study can be applied to study 
public acceptance of transportation policies elsewhere.  
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Size of the company 200 employees 
Survey method Paper based 
Location Zone 1 
Company 2 Shanghai Petroleum and Chemical Equipment Corporation Ltd. 
Industry category Chemical plant 
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Size of the company 20 employees 
Survey method Online 
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